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Matteo Gatti

Professor of Law

Matteo Gatti is a professor of law at Rutgers and a Research Member of the European Corporate Governance Institute. He writes about corporate power, governance, and the shifting role of business in public life. His work spans corporate law, M&A, and political economy, with a focus on accountability and stakeholder dynamics. Before entering academia, he practiced corporate law in New York and Europe. He is the author of two books and numerous articles.
a man with a beard smiling

Location

Rutgers Law School 123 Washington Street 494 Newark, NJ 07102

Phone
973-353-5159
Email

mgatti@law.rutgers.edu

Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae

Role

Faculty

Areas of Expertise

Securities Regulation, Securities Litigation, Mergers & Acquisitions, International Finance, Executive Compensation, Economics (Law &), Corporate Governance, Corporate Compliance, Comparative Law, Bankruptcy

Biography

Matteo Gatti is a professor of law at Rutgers Law School and a Research Member of the European Corporate Governance Institute. His work sits at the intersection of corporate law, financial regulation, and political economy, with a particular focus on corporate power, governance structures, and transnational legal change.

He holds degrees from the University of Milan (J.D., summa cum laude), Harvard Law School (LL.M.), and the University of Brescia (S.J.D.), and has worked in both legal practice and in-house counsel roles on cross-border corporate and M&A matters.

His scholarly work has been published or accepted for publication in journals such as the Stanford Law Review, Journal of Corporation Law, BYU Law Review, North Carolina Law Review, Columbia Law Review Forum, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, and the European Business Organization Law Review. His research has been cited in major treatises and regulatory reviews, including by the European Commission. He is the author of two books, including the forthcoming Corporate Power and the Politics of Change (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

Gatti has held visiting appointments and fellowships at institutions including Goethe University Frankfurt and Harvard Law School, and lectures regularly in Europe and North America. He is a frequent contributor to the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, the CLS Blue Sky Blog, and the Oxford Business Law Blog. He is admitted to the New York Bar.

Publications

  1. Corporate Power and the Politics of Change, forthcoming Cambridge University Press, 2025.
  2. How the EU Sustainability Due Diligence Directive Could Reshape Corporate America, with Luca Enriques & Roy Shapira, Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 817/2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5083571, forthcoming 78 Stan. L. Rev.
  3. Corporate Governing: Understanding Corporations as Agents of Socioeconomic Change, 50 J. Corp. L. 149-207 (2024).
  4. What Corporate Governance for AI?, Jotwell (June 13, 2024) (reviewing Roberto Tallarita, AI Is Testing the Limits of Corporate Governance, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 05, 2023)), https://corp.jotwell.com/what-corporate-governance-for-ai/.
  5. Death by a Thousand Cuts: Hostile Bids in Europe, 2004-2023, with Luca Enriques, in Twenty Years of the Takeover Directive (forthcoming 2024, Martin Winner et al. eds, Cambridge University Press), Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 755/2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4738087.
  6. Corporate Governance for Carbon Majors, with Suren Gomtsyan & Alessandro Romano, Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 787/2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4887604.
  7. Barking without Biting: How Corwin (Did Not) Change M&A, with Martin Gelter, Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 808/2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4988673.
  8. How Does Board-Shareholder Engagement Really Work? Evidence from a Survey of Corporate Officers and from Disclosure Data, with Giovanni Strampelli and Matteo Tonello, in Board-Shareholder Dialogue: Policy Debate, Legal Constraints and Best Practices (Luca Enriques & Giovanni Strampelli eds., Cambridge University Press, 2024).
  9. Corporate Governing: Understanding Corporations as Agents of Socioeconomic Change (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 730/2024, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4530776).
  10. The Long-Standing Narrative of Stock Market-Driven Short-Termism, Book Review of Missing the Target: Why Stock-Market Short-Termism Is Not the Problem. By Mark J. Roe. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2022 (2023, working paper).
  11. The Perils of a Stakeholderist Corporate Law Reform: A Reply to Professor Kovvali, with Chrystin Ondersma, 123 Colum. L. Rev. Forum 229-251 (2023).
  12. Interested Voting, 48 BYU L. Rev. 1619-95 (2023).
  13. Why Corporate America Should Pay Attention to the Proposed EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, with Luca Enriques, Columbia BlueSky Law Blog (Apr. 25, 2022) [original post, not featuring a separate paper].
  14. Creeping Acquisitions in Europe, with Luca Enriques, in European Takeovers: The Art of Acquisition (3rd ed., 2022, Alejandro Fernández de Araoz ed.).
  15. Collusion and Other Deviations from the Highest Paid Price Rule, with Federica Cadorin, in European Takeovers: The Art of Acquisition (3rd ed., 2022, Alejandro Fernández de Araoz ed.).
  16. Stakeholder Syndrome: Does Stakeholderism Derail Effective Protections for Weaker Constituencies?, with Chrystin Ondersma, 100 N.C. L. Rev. 167-235 (2021).
  17. Foreword, in The Conference Board, 2021 Proxy Season Preview and Shareholder Voting Trends (2017-2020) (2021).
  18. Can a Broader Corporate Purpose Redress Inequality? The Stakeholder Approach Chimera, with Chrystin Ondersma. 46 J. Corp. L. 1-73 (2020).
  19. Did Delaware Really Kill Corporate Law? Shareholder Protection in a Post-Corwin World 16 N.Y.U. J. Bus. L. 345-418 (2020).
  20. Board-Shareholder Engagement Practices. Findings from a 2018 Survey of SEC-Registered Companies 1-43, with Matteo Tonello, Conference Board Director Notes (2019).
  21. Upsetting Deals and Reform Loop: Can Companies and M&A Law in Europe Adapt to the Market for Corporate Control?, 25 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1-74 (2019).
  22. Creeping Acquisitions in Europe 27-38, with Luca Enriques, in European Takeovers: The Art of Acquisition (2nd ed., 2018, Jeremy Grant ed.).
  23. Reconsidering the Mergers Process: Approval Patterns, Timeline, and Shareholders’ Role in Mergers, 69 Hastings L.J. 835-924 (2018).
  24. It’s My Stock and I’ll Vote If I Want To: Conflicted Voting by Shareholders in (Hostile) M&A Deals, 47 U. Mem. L. Rev. 181-290 (2016).
  25. Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry, with Luca Enriques, 15 J. Corp. L. Studies 55-101 (2015).
  26. The Power to Decide on Takeovers: Directors or Shareholders, What Difference Does it Make?, 20 Ford. J. Corp. & Fin. L. 73-144 (2014).
  27. Is There a Uniform EU Securities Laws After the Financial Services Action Plan?, with Luca Enriques, in Company Law and Finance 167 (Paul Krüger Andersen & Karsten Engsig Sørensen eds., 2008).
  28. Is There a Uniform EU Securities Laws After the Financial Services Action Plan?, with Luca Enriques, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin 43-82 (2008).
  29. EC Reforms of Corporate Governance and Capital Markets Regulation: How Do They Affect Outside Investors?, with Luca Enriques, 28 Nw. J. Int.’l L. & Bus. 1-34 (2007).
  30. The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the European Union, with Luca Enriques, in Economics of European Union Law 576 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2007)
  31. The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the European Union, with Luca Enriques, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ L. 939-98 (2006).
  32. Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the Takeover Directive, in European Takeovers. The Art of Acquisition 103 (Jeremy Grant ed., 2005).
  33. Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the Takeover Directive, 6 Eur. Bus. & Org. L. Rev. 553-79 (2005).
  34. Mancata promozione di opa obbligatoria e risarcimento del danno, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2005, II, 774-96 [Liability for Failure to Launch a Mandatory Bid].
  35. Accordi opzionali e reciprocità nella direttiva sulle opa, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata, 2005, 416-33 [Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European Takeover Directive].
  36. Appunti sulla nozione di partecipazione rilevante per i presupposti e per l’oggetto dell’opa successiva alla luce della riforma del t.u.f., Diritto banca mercati finanziari, 2005, 163-76 [Notes on the Definition of Participation Interest Relevant for the Mandatory Bid Regime under the Revised Consolidated Financial Act].
  37. Opa e struttura del mercato del controllo societario, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004, 1-389 [Tender Offers and the Structure of the Market for Corporate Control].
  38. Le azioni con voto subordinato all’effettuazione di un’opa e l’«autorizzazione di conferma», Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2004, I, 511-41 [Shares with Voting Rights Contingent upon a Tender Offer and the Principle of “Subsequent Authorization”].
  39. Una proposta discussa in materia di opa: la risoluzione legislativa del Parlamento europeo sulla tredicesima direttiva, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2001, I, 141-46 [A Debated Proposal on Tender Offers: The European Parliament Resolution on the XIII Directive].
  40. Responsabilita’ dei revisori negli USA, in Amministratori Fiduciari: Di chi? (Antonino D’Angelo ed., 2001) [Auditors’ Liability under U.S. Law].
  41. La passivity rule in Italia, in Amministratori Fiduciari: Di chi? (Antonino D’Angelo ed., 2001) [Directors’ Passivity Rule in Italy].
  42. La società target in pendenza di offerta pubblica d’acquisto, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2000, I, 599-654 [The Target Company pending a Tender Offer].
  43. Il controllo dell’ufficio del registro delle imprese, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 1998, II, 632-50 [The Scrutiny of the Register of Companies].